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1. Introduction 
 
 Analysis of corporate security offerings has been an intriguing area of academic 
research in corporate finance. The topic of equity issues has received the major attention. 
Eckbo and Masulis (1995) observe that the available empirical evidence is mainly 
concerned with corporate funding sources, flotation methods and stock market valuation 
effects of seasoned equity issues. In this study, we address a new but closely related issue. 
We examine whether the stock market valuation effect observed during the announcement 
of seasoned equity offerings is consistent with the subsequent operating performance of 
firms that raised additional equity. The paper thus seeks to contribute further evidence on 
the forward-looking characteristic of the stock market. 
 Previous studies mainly based on U.S. data unanimously show that the stock 
market reacts negatively to announcement of seasoned equity issues. But, studies on equity 
rights issues have so far produced conflicting results. In a rights issue, corporations wishing 
to raise additional equity capital distribute certain rights to existing shareholders on a pro 
rata basis. These rights entitle them to buy a certain number of new shares proportionate to 
their existing shareholdings at a pre-specified price. Shareholders unwilling to buy these 
new shares are free to sell their rights in the market during a pre-specified time period. By 
specifically focusing on companies that use the flotation method of rights offering to raise 
new external equity, this study adds to the on-going international debate concerning the 
valuation effect of rights issues. 
 The paper also contributes to the literature on rights offerings in another direction. 
Any change in stock price after the issue-announcement, and specifically, during the 
designated rights trading period is expected to influence shareholders’ decisions to sell their 
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rights. Little empirical evidence exists on the stock price behavior during this rights 
trading period. In this paper, we fill this gap. We also examine the price and the trading 
volume behavior of rights and analyze the relationship between the announcement period 
stock return and rights trading. 
 To address these issues, we collect data for a sample of equity rights offerings made 
by Dutch firms and analyze the behavior of stock returns during the announcement period 
and the rights trading period. We then examine the operating performance of these firms 
for five years after the offerings. Our results show that a marked decline in stock price takes 
place when companies announce rights issues. A more detailed analysis did not reveal any 
contradictory result. Investigating the period of rights trading, we observe that rights are 
traded actively and stock prices, on average, decline during the subscription period. Next, 
we investigate the operating performance of companies up to five years after rights issue. 
We find a significant deterioration in operating performance. Diverse return on assets and 
return on sales performance measures show that rights issuing firms significantly 
underperform. Since the result is consistent with the previously obtained announcement 
period decline in stock returns, we conclude that the stock market has the ability to 
correctly anticipate subsequent operating performance of firms. 
 We also investigate the factors that can explain the observed stock and operating 
performance decline. Our results find statistical support for the asymmetric information 
hypothesis which argues that corporate managers possess superior information about their 
firms than outside investors. We also find partial support for the overinvestment of cash 
flows hypothesis which argues that managers have incentives to invest cash flows in 
increasing firm size and perquisites. In contrast, there was no support for the window of 
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opportunity hypothesis which argues that corporate managers decide on equity offerings 
depending on favorable economic conditions. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses salient 
features of equity rights issues and summarizes the empirical evidence from recent studies. 
Section 3 describes the sample and the methodology. The results of the study are presented 
and analyzed in Section 4. The section begins by providing summary statistics and 
analyzing the stock price behavior of rights issuing firms. It then documents post-issue 
operating performance and tests several hypotheses to explain the observed valuation 
changes. The last section summarizes the study. 
 
2. Rights issues 
 
2.1 Background 
 
 Listed corporations around the world typically raise additional external equity 
capital either from existing shareholders or from new investors. The first method is 
commonly known as rights issue and is widely used in diverse European and international 
capital markets. A variant of this method is known as standby, insured or underwritten 
rights issue where an underwriter or a syndicate guarantees to purchase any unsubscribed 
shares. The second flotation method, commonly known as general cash offers or firm 
commitment offers, is the usual practice in the United States. It is also common to use the 
service of an underwriter with this method of flotation.1 
 
1 Two other closely related flotation methods, known as open offers and placings, have started 
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 Marsh (1979), Levis (1995) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) document that 
seasoned equity issues in the United Kingdom are predominantly rights issues. Widespread 
use of rights offerings in many European countries is reported in different studies by De 
Jong and Veld (2001) for the Netherlands; Gajewski and Ginglinger (1998) for France; 
Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) for Norway; Tsangarakis (1996) for Greece; Loderer 
and Zimmermann (1988) for Switzerland; and Berglund, Liljeblom and Wahlroos (1987) 
for Finland. Rights offerings are also observed, although not frequently, in Japan (Kang and 
Stulz, 1996). 
 In the United States, on the other hand, rights issues have become a rarity. Smith 
(1977) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) observe that although the direct flotation costs of an 
underwritten equity issue are significantly higher than the costs of a (non-underwritten) 
rights issue, more than 80% of equity offerings in the U.S. are, paradoxically, non-rights 
offerings. In an attempt to explain this paradox, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Kothare 
(1997) argue that some indirect costs like capital gains taxes, transaction costs of selling 
rights, increased bid-ask spread, etc. are in fact associated with rights issues. But, these 
factors seem not to be important enough to deter the frequent use of rights issues in many 
countries. Besides lower flotation costs, there exist some other explanations for the 
dominant use of rights issues in these countries. The charter of corporations or stock 
exchange listing requirements make it obligatory for firms to use rights offerings. Firms’ 
existing shareholders may also want their relative shareholdings to remain unchanged 
because of control, dilution and other considerations following a equity rights issue. The 
underwriting syndicate may also have a preference for rights issue because it increases the 
 
taking place in the United Kingdom since the late 1980s (Armitage, 2000; Slovin et al. 2000). 
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probability of success of the issue. 
 In line with other European countries, rights issue is the norm in the Netherlands. 
Corporate charters provide existing shareholders the pre-emptive right to purchase new 
issues of common equity. Another special feature is that Dutch firms always adopt standby 
rights offer method. Thus, investment banks or other financial institutions guarantee the 
execution of any unexercised rights. The regulation of the Amsterdam Exchanges does not 
allow listed firms to issue equity without using a financial intermediary. Insured rights 
offering is also used most frequently in the U.K. The situation is different from the United 
States and Norway where about 30 - 40% of equity rights offers by industrial firms are 
uninsured rights.2 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence 
 
 Empirical evidence from the United States indicates that stock price declines with 
the announcement of seasoned equity issues. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) report that the 
announcement of seasoned offerings of common stocks in the U.S. leads to a 3-4% average 
abnormal decline in stock prices in a period of two-days. For rights issues in the U.S. a 
stock price decline is also observed, but the magnitude is found to be smaller. Hansen 
(1989) reports excess decline of 2.6% for a sample of 22 industrial underwritten rights 
offerings. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) document an excess decline of around 1%. 
 On the other hand, non-U.S. evidence on the announcement effect of rights issue is 
 
2 Armitage (1998) and Slovin et al. (2000) provide a detailed comparison of institutional settings in 
the U.S. and the U.K. 
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somewhat mixed. Levis (1995) examines 152 rights issues in the United Kingdom and 
finds a statistically significant two-day excess return of –1.3%. Slovin et al. (2000) 
distinguished between insured and uninsured rights issues in the U.K. They find a 
statistically significant two-day excess stock return of –2.90% for 200 insured rights 
offerings and –4.96% for 20 uninsured rights offerings. Gajewski and Ginglinger (1998) 
also report significant negative excess stock returns associated with rights offerings in 
France. Analyzing Norwegian data, Bohren et al. (1997) document an insignificant excess 
return of –0.4% for 89 standby rights offerings but a statistically significant positive excess 
return of 2% in case of 37 uninsured rights offerings. 
 In contrast to these findings, Kang and Stulz (1996) observe a significant positive 
announcement effect (2.2%) for a small sample of 28 rights issues in Japan. Tsangarakis 
(1996) investigates 59 rights offering in Greece and also finds a significant excess return of 
as much as 4%. It is not clear if the positive stock price effect is caused by distinct 
institutional features of these stock markets like the absence of an active market for rights 
and highly concentrated / affiliated ownership structure of firms. 
 A few studies also examine the long-run stock performance after seasoned equity 
issues. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) document 
significant stock price underperformance over 2 - 5 years following equity issues in the 
United States. Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) observe long-run stock price underperformance 
for Japanese firms issuing equity. Levis (1995) also reports significant long-run stock 
underperformance from a sample of rights issues in the U.K. Although no generally 
accepted explanation for these findings exists, there are indications that long-run stock 
performance measurement is quite sensitive to the econometric estimation technique used. 
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Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) show that methodological improvements lead to the 
disappearance of any long-run stock price underperformance. 
 Although the stock market effect of rights issues has received some attention, there 
is no empirical evidence yet on the operating performance of rights issuing firms. A 
growing body of research has started to examine the operating performance of other types 
of security offerings. Loughran and Ritter (1997) and McLaughlin et al. (1996) analyzed 
operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity issues in the United States. 
They document that firm performance deteriorates after the offering. In another study, Lee 
and Loughran (1998) report major decline in operating performance of firms following 
convertible debt offerings. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 We compile a list of all seasoned common stock public offerings made by Dutch 
listed industrial companies between January 1984 and December 1995 from the annual 
reports of the Amsterdam Exchanges. In total, there were 79 common stock issues out of 
which 67 (85%) were rights issues. These issues involve 62 different companies spreading 
over a variety of  industries and come from a total of about 170 Dutch industrial companies 
listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges during that period. The few non-rights equity issues 
were made jointly on international stock markets and/or related to organizational 
restructuring.  
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 Due to a different institutional and regulatory environment with respect to 
financial companies (banks, insurance companies and securities firms), we focus our 
attention, conforming to the earlier literature, on non-financial firms. Moreover, an analysis 
of operating performance of financial companies is less meaningful and difficult to 
compare with those of non-financial companies. The final sample consists of 58 equity 
rights issues. We collect annual financial statement data of firms for up to five years after 
rights issues. These data are collected from REACH (a Dutch database available on CD-
ROM), and whenever necessary, from Yearbooks of Dutch Companies and company 
annual reports.3  
 In order to identify the precise announcement date of rights issues, we search the 
publications of Amsterdam Exchanges and the daily Dutch financial newspaper 'Het 
Financieele Dagblad' (the Wall Street Journal of the Netherlands). Daily stock returns are 
calculated by collecting adjusted share prices from Datastream and cash dividends 
information from the financial newspaper. Since there exists no database which compiles 
information on rights trading, we search the newspaper to collect all rights related 
information. We also hand collect daily rights price and rights trading volume observed 
during the subscription period.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 A standard event study methodology is used to measure share price reaction to 
rights offering announcements. The excess stock return is calculated in two ways: as the 
 
3 We are grateful to Abe de Jong for providing some of these data. 
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differences between the realized return from the return predicted by the Market Model and 
the return of the Dutch stock market index. The Market Model parameters are estimated 
over 200-trading days surrounding the event period. We define the event period to be from 
60 days before the announcement to 30 days after the announcement. We investigate 
cumulative excess stock returns for several sub-periods: two-day cumulative excess return 
for the announcement period; 60-day cumulative excess return for the pre-announcement 
period; and 29-day cumulative excess return for the post-announcement period. Our null 
hypothesis is that cumulative average (median) excess stock returns are equal to zero. In 
order to test whether the cumulative average excess return is significantly different from 
zero, we perform a conventional t-test based on standardized excess returns. We also 
perform non-parametric tests such as sign test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
 Similar to stock returns, the operating performance of firms conducting rights 
issues is examined by analyzing excess measures of operating performance. The procedure 
of calculating the excess operating performance is as follows. For each issuing firm, and for 
each year during the period 1984-1999, we first select the universe of all non-issuing listed 
firms. These non-issuing firms are chosen in such a way that no equity offering, initial 
public offering or seasoned offering, is made by a firm during the preceding five years. The 
procedure involves selecting a new sample of non-issuing firms in each year. We choose as 
a match the median operating performance from the control portfolio of all non-issuing 
firms in that year, and then calculate the difference in performance measure. This 
difference is denoted as abnormal or excess operating performance.4 
 
4 An improvement of this methodology would be to select firms on the basis of their size, industry 
or pre-event performance. But, the lack of numerous Dutch listed firms does not allow us to follow 
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 For each firm in the sample, the operating performance is evaluated by using a 
wide variety of measures. Four different variants of return on assets (ROA) measures are 
used at first. These variables are calculated as follows: net income divided by the average 
of beginning- and ending-period book value of total assets, cash flow (net income plus 
depreciation plus the change in current assets excluding the change in cash minus the 
change in current liabilities plus the change in current maturities of long-term debt) divided 
by the average value of total assets, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by 
the average value of total assets, and earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the average value of total assets. All these 
measures are scaled by the average book value of total assets to allow for comparison 
across firms and through time. 
 The proceeds of a new equity issue usually results in an increase in cash or other 
assets. Consequently, the ROA measure for sample firms will probably be lower. 
Following Barber and Lyon (1996), we, therefore, construct an additional operating 
performance definition, namely, profit margin or return on sales (ROS). Similar to ROA, 
we calculate four variants of ROS measures using the average of beginning- and ending-
period value of total sales in lieu of total assets. Scaling by total sales has the additional 
advantage of overcoming the historical cost problem associated with total assets. 
 For all these eight different performance measures, we first calculate levels of 
abnormal operating performance, and then as a robustness check, calculate year-to-year 
changes in abnormal performance. The level (change) of operating performance of rights 
issuing firm is adjusted by subtracting the median level (change) of operating performance 
 
any of these approaches. 
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of control portfolio of non-issuing firms. In line with previous work, the analysis of the 
sample operating performance is performed using the median values due to the inherent 
skewness in operating performance variables (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; McLaughlin et 
al., 1996). Abnormal operating performance is also cumulated over a period of up to five 
years after rights issue. For all median values, we determine the statistical significance by 
calculating the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Sample characteristics 
 
 Some descriptive information on rights issues and firm characteristics is presented 
in Table 1. We first provide information on the issue-size and the issue-price. By scaling 
the monetary amount of rights issue with the market value of common equity on the day 
before announcement, we find that average rights issue represents 21% (median = 16%) of 
firm’s outstanding common equity. This is roughly similar to U.S. and U.K. rights issues. 
Analyzing the offer price of rights issues we observe that it is, on average, set below the 
market price prevailing during the days before the announcement. The average issue-price 
(subscription price discount) in our sample of rights issues is 88% (13%) with a standard 
deviation of 10%. This is slightly less than the average offer price discount observed in 
case of insured rights offerings in the U.S. (20% reported by Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) and 
in the U.K. (17% reported by Slovin et al., 2000).5 The average subscription price discount 
 
5 In the U.S., the offer price is established not at the time of announcement of an equity issue but 
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is remarkably higher in Norway (about 50% reported by Bohren et. al., 1997) and Greece 
(38% reported by Tsangarakis, 1996). 
 The size of firms undertaking rights offerings is measured by the book value of 
total assets and by the market value of common equity. The mean total assets value for 
rights issuing firms is 623 millions Euros while the median is 178 million Euros. Similarly, 
the mean stock market capitalization of sample firms is 349 million Euros while the median 
is 113 million Euros. Wide differences between median and mean values of both total 
assets and total equity indicate the presence of some large firms in the sample.  The 
average value of market-to-book ratio (defined as end-of-year market value of common 
equity plus book value of total debt divided by end-of-year book value of total assets) is 
close to unity. The ratio is quite variable across firms – the minimum in our sample is 0.65 
while the maximum is 2.09. 
 
4.2 Stock market response 
 
 The stock price reaction to announcements of equity rights offerings is presented in 
Table 2. Excess stock returns are estimated in two ways: after adjusting for each stock’s 
systematic risk estimated from the Market Model, and after adjusting for the general stock 
market index.6 Our results show that the stock price announcement effect is significantly 
negative. On the day of the announcement of rights issue (day 0), the average excess 
 
only at the start of the subscription period. 
6 Since the results estimated from both methods are basically the same, we report the risk-
adjusted excess returns only. 
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decline is about two percent. An additional half a percent decline takes place on the day 
after the announcement. In two days time, shareholders of rights issuing firms suffer an 
average abnormal wealth reduction of about 2.8% (Panel A). The t-value of -7.89 indicates 
that the two-day cumulative average abnormal return is statistically significant. 
 Since the sample size is not large, it is useful to calculate median excess returns. 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 2. The two-day announcement period median 
excess return is –1.76%. The corresponding Wilcoxon signed rank statistic (3.09) indicates 
that the median return is statistically significant at the 1% level. We further check and find 
that 64% of announcement period excess returns are negative. A sign test shows that the 
fraction of negative returns is significant at the 5% level. The finding of a significant stock 
price decline associated with the announcement of equity rights issue is, therefore, invariant 
to the different ways of calculating excess returns. Our result is also consistent with that 
found earlier by Hansen (1989), Levis (1995), Bohren et al. (1997) and Slovin et al. (2000). 
 The magnitude of the excess stock return attributed to rights issue announcements 
will be incorrect if these announcements also coincide with confounding events. Therefore, 
for all rights issues in our sample, we check the financial press to see if other kinds of 
information releases coincide with issue announcements. We observe that many equity 
offering announcements are made in conjunction with announcements unrelated to equity 
offerings, such as earnings increases or decreases, mergers and acquisitions, company 
restructuring and reorganizations, etc.  
 Although confounding events can produce a neutral impact when the effects are in 
opposite directions, we decide to investigate the financial press thoroughly. We find that 
only nine rights issue announcements are absolutely free from any confounding event. No 
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other material information unrelated to equity offerings is found to be disclosed at the 
time of rights issue announcements. Even though the sample size in this case becomes very 
small, it is worthwhile to see if the previously obtained finding from the full sample 
remains valid. Our analysis shows that a significant stock price decline still takes place 
when these rights issues are announced (the average decline is 2.56% in two days). 
Confounding events do not appear to change the direction of average price reaction 
obtained from the full sample. 
 The equity issuing firms intend to use issue-proceeds for several purposes such as 
new investments, financing takeovers, debt repayment, etc. It is interesting to examine if 
rights issuing firms with new investment plans exhibit a different stock price reaction 
compared to firms with other issue-purposes.7 Therefore, we analyze a new sample 
consisting of 18 rights offerings where the financing of new investment projects is cited as 
the reason of new equity issue. We find that these firms with new investment plans also 
experience a statistically significant average excess decline (-1.06%) in their stock price. 
However, the magnitude of the stock price decline is smaller than that obtained for the total 
sample. 
 Overall, the empirical evidence provided in this study suggests that the 
announcement of rights issues is associated with a significant decline in stock return. The 
finding is insensitive to one or another stock return estimation procedure or specific 
characteristic related to rights issues. The result is also consistent with the valuation effect 
of rights issues documented in several prior studies.  
 
7 Firms always announce what to do with regard to the use of proceeds from equity offerings. 
Announcing the purpose of the issue is, therefore, not considered as a confounding event. 
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4.3 Analysis of rights trading period 
 
 We observe in Table 2 that the cumulative excess stock return during the post-
announcement period (day +2 to day +30) is negative. The mean (median) risk-adjusted 
excess stock return is –2.55% (-4.08%). This decline in stock returns indicates that the 
market receives additional unfavorable information following rights issue announcements. 
After conducting additional investigation, we find that the issue prospectus is usually 
published a few days after the announcement of rights issue, and subsequently, the trading 
in rights starts on the stock exchange. Our analysis reveals that the median number of days 
from the announcement of rights issue until the start of rights trading is 17. This is in 
contrast to the practice prevailing in the U.K. where rights trading usually starts on the day 
the offer is formally announced (Armitage, 2000). U.K. firms are also increasingly 
adopting open offers, which are similar to rights issues except that the existing shareholders 
can not sell their rights. In the U.S., on the other hand, rights trading starts six to seven 
weeks after the announcement (Hansen, 1989). Stockholders have thus several days to 
decide either to accept the offer of the right or to sell the rights in the market. Stock price 
development is expected to play an influential role during this time period. Shareholders 
will evaluate any loss from share price decline with the gain from selling the rights. Those 
who do not wish to take up their rights are then faced with the decision of when to sell the 
rights. 
 In order to examine rights trading in detail, we hand collect information on daily 
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price and trading volume of 55 rights issues from the financial newspaper.8 We observe 
that the length of the subscription period ranges from a minimum of 6 days to a maximum 
of 13 days, with a median of 9. Since the rights trading period varies from firm to firm, the 
number of available firms in the sample continues to decline drastically towards the end. 
For a sample of 22 industrial rights offerings in the U.S., Hansen (1989) finds that the 
length of subscription period varies from 9 to 14 days. Armitage (2000) reports that the 
rights trading period in the U.K. must last a minimum of three weeks. 
 Analyzing the behavior of rights price during the offer period, we observe that 
rights prices are, on average, the highest during the initial days of trading and the lowest 
towards the end. The period of the initial four days of rights trading is accompanied by 
cumulative average rights price decline of 6%. It is followed by another cumulative 
average decline of 16% during the next four days. We also analyze daily trading volume 
behavior of rights. Our analysis shows that active rights trading starts from the beginning of 
the subscription period, and it reaches the highest level at the end. Since investors are not 
required to disclose their identity, we are unable to find out who buys or sells these 
rights. Singh (1997) analyzes a sample of rights offerings by public utility companies in 
the U.S. and finds that underwriters play an active role in the market for rights by 
purchasing rights in the offer period. 
 It is interesting to see how stock prices evolve during the period of rights trading. 
Investors usually evaluate expected changes in both stock price and rights price to decide if 
they are better/worse off in holding the rights. The analysis of stock returns also allows us 
to determine if the stock price change is consistent with the earlier observed post-
 
8 We are unable to find rights related information in the newspaper for all firms. 
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announcement period change in stock returns. We compute, therefore, excess stock 
returns for up to eight days of rights trading - the period consisting of about 90% of sample 
firms. The number of firms with rights trading reduces by 40% on the ninth trading day and 
by more than 90% on the tenth trading day.  
 The results are reported in Table 3. Day 1 is defined as the first trading day of 
rights, day 2 is the second trading day, and so on. We find that the cumulative average 
excess stock return during the eight days of rights trading is –1.35%. In each but one day 
the average excess stock return is negative and the majority fraction of firms experience 
negative stock returns. We also observe that the magnitude of stock price decline is higher 
on later days, a period coinciding with the highest level of trading volume of rights. Rights 
trading, therefore, accounts for part of the stock price decline observed during the post-
announcement period. 
 We also explore if the volume of rights trade can explain the announcement period 
excess return. Intense rights trading indicates that existing stockholders are less willing to 
exercise their rights. Any such anticipation by the stock market may, in turn, aggravate the 
decline in stock price. We regress announcement period excess stock return on the 
cumulative volume of rights traded defined as the total market value of rights divided by 
pre-announcement stock market capitalization. We conduct univariate and multivariate 
regressions with different variable definitions. The results, not reported here, show that 
although the coefficient of rights volume is negative, it is statistically insignificant. 
 
4.4 Operating performance 
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 So far, we have analyzed the stock market reaction to equity rights issue 
announcements. We now raise the following question: is the post-issue operating 
performance of firms consistent with the stock price effect observed during rights issue 
announcement? Or, stated differently, can the stock market correctly anticipate future 
changes in firms’ operating performance? If raising additional capital by means of equity 
offerings leads to improvement in firm’s performance, then the previously documented 
negative announcement effect should be considered as an anomalous finding. On the other 
hand, if stock price changes are considered to be forward looking and correct, then post-
rights issue operating performance would show deterioration. We address this issue in the 
following paragraphs. 
 The excess operating performance of firms subsequent to rights issue is reported in 
Table 4. As mentioned earlier, for each issuing firm, we identify all listed firms without any 
initial public offering or seasoned equity issue during the preceding five years. Abnormal 
or excess operating performance is then calculated as the difference in performance 
between issuing firm and median non-issuing firm. The Table documents median abnormal 
levels of operating performance for the period beginning with the year of rights issue up to 
five years after right issue. Panel A presents the results for four Return on Assets (ROA) 
measures while panel B reports those for Return on Sales (ROS) measures. Overall, the 
results reveal a clear picture: each of the eight variants of performance measures is negative 
in post-rights issue years. Many of these excess declines are statistically significant as 
determined from the Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic. Rights issuing firms systematically 
experience an abnormal decline in operating performance. The magnitude of different post-
rights issue five years cumulative average ROA excess performance measures varies from 
  19
–6.2% to –9.1% while that of ROS measures varies from –1.2% to –14.1%. We now 
explain these results in detail.  
 In Panel A of Table 4, we observe that all four ROA performance measures during 
the five years after equity issues are negative. Looking at the performance variable net 
income / total assets, we find that the median abnormal decline is more than one percent in 
each of the years 2 - 5. Three of these declines are statistically significant. Similar 
statistically significant declines are observed in other return on assets variables for the post-
rights issue years. The decline in performance is statistically insignificant in the first year 
after equity issue. As one might expect, it can be too early to notice any significant change 
in operating performance immediately in year 1. The results from the two operating income 
related performance variables (EBIT and EBITDA) also indicate underperformance of 
firms in each of the five post-issue years. 
 Turning to Panel B, we observe once again that in each post-rights issue year all 
excess ROS (or profit-margin) performance variables are negative. The effect is found to be 
insignificant in the first year after rights issue. The net profit margin (net income / total 
sales) variable shows statistically significant decline in years 3 and 5. The median excess 
cash flow margin (cash flow / total sales) in year 2 is –1.9% which is statistically 
significant. The significant deterioration in cash flow margin persists in year 3. The 
underperformance of issuing firms is also evident when we evaluate operating profit 
margin measures. The decline according to the performance metric EBIT / total sales is 
statistically significant in the third, fourth and fifth year following rights offering. Overall, 
we find the results using ROS measures qualitatively similar to those of ROA measures.  
 We check the robustness of above findings by calculating year-to-year abnormal 
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change in operating performance of rights issuing firms. The results are presented in 
Table 5. In Panel A, the reported median changes in return on assets are negative in the 
majority of cases during the five years following rights issue. Panel B reports median 
changes in returns on sales measures. These are also mostly negative. The results being 
similar to the ones obtained earlier reinforce our finding that rights issuing firms undergo 
an abnormal decline in their operating performance. 
 Overall, we document significant negative operating performance of firms after 
rights issues. The post-rights issue decline in operating performance is also consistent with 
the negative announcement period stock returns. Our results indicate that the observed 
value decline in the stock market at the time of announcement of rights issue comes from 
the expected deterioration in future operating performance of firms. The evidence provided 
here, therefore, leads us to believe that the stock market can correctly anticipate future 
operating performance of firms. When we compare our results with those of non-rights 
equity issues in the United States as reported by Loughran and Ritter (1997) and 
McLaughlin, Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1996), we observe that our results are quite 
similar in direction. But, the magnitude of the average decline in operating performance for 
rights issuing firms is smaller. It corresponds well to the earlier results obtained from stock 
return analysis which indicates that the magnitude of stock price change is also smaller for 
firms issuing equity rights. 
 
4.5 Explanation of underperformance 
 
 We have, so far, documented a significant decline in stock price with the 
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announcement of equity rights issue and a significant decline in post-issue operating 
performance of firms. In this section, we investigate the sources that can explain the 
observed underperformance in stock returns and operating performance. First of all, we 
consider the leading theoretical explanations put forward in the literature. 
  
4.5.1 Theoretical explanations 
 
 It is widely believed that company managers know more about their own firm 
than the stock market because they possess private information on either the value of 
assets-in-place or investment opportunities. This private information is conveyed to the 
capital market, either intentionally or unintentionally, in a variety of ways including that 
of issuing new securities. Myers and Majluf (1984) were the first to show that managers 
with superior private information have incentives to issue equity when the prevailing 
market price of shares is larger than their intrinsic value (i.e. the stock is overvalued). 
Knowing that managers will avoid issuing undervalued shares, investors interpret an equity 
issue as a signal of overvaluation. This reasoning is formally known in the literature as 
the information asymmetry hypothesis.9  
 The simplest version of this hypothesis predicts an immediate drop in share 
 
9 In case of rights issues firm’s existing stockholders obtain a certain number of rights to subscribe 
newly issued equity. As long as all these rights are exercised, the argument of information 
asymmetry should not play a role in rights offerings. However, the fact that existing shareholders 
sell their rights and new investors buy shares indicates that information asymmetry does play, albeit 
diminished, role. 
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price when companies announce new equity issues. The greater the overvaluation 
(information asymmetry), the higher would be the stock price decline.10 A related model 
developed by Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) argues that the announcement effect 
of equity issues in fact reflects the source of asymmetric information: value of existing 
assets or future investment opportunities. According to the model, the negative market 
reaction to stock issue will be aggravated for low growth firms (these have abundant 
assets-in-place but limited opportunities to invest) whereas the effect will be mitigated 
for high growth firms (these have limited assets but abundant opportunities to invest). 
 A second hypothesis predicting stock price decline associated with equity issue 
announcement is known as the overinvestment of free cash flows hypothesis (Jensen, 
1986). It views that corporate managers prefer to increase the amount of assets under 
their control even if doing so causes reduction in firm value. They prefer to invest more 
of firm’s free cash flows in 'empire building' and in perquisites instead of distributing 
these to shareholders. Equity offerings thus convey higher probability of overinvestment 
of free cash flows on the part of managers. Share price would, therefore, decline because 
with higher amount of equity capital firms’ stockholders are faced with considerably higher 
agency costs.  
 Another explanation is provided by the window of opportunity hypothesis which 
suggests that managers decide on equity issues based on favorable economic conditions 
 
10 The fact that company managers have better information than investors creates an adverse 
selection problem: as the decision to issue equity results in a loss of firm value, higher quality 
firms (with valuable investment projects) making equity issues are treated similar to lower 
quality firms. 
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like business cycle expansions and hot issue periods (Choe, Masulis and Nanda, 1993; 
Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996). Better investment opportunities are available for firms 
during these periods. Firms will have more possibilities in making investments in high 
quality (profitable) projects. Stock price reaction is, therefore, expected to be less 
negative for equity issues announced during good time periods. 
 
4.5.2 Proxy variables 
 
 In order to investigate the validity of the above hypotheses in explaining the 
performance of rights issuing firms, we use various proxies for information asymmetry, 
free cash flows and window of opportunity, and employ different models of cross-sectional 
regression analyses. We consider two variables to proxy information asymmetry. These are 
the relative size of rights issue defined as the monetary amount of rights issue divided by 
the market value of firm’s equity, and the offer price discount defined as the rights issue 
price divided by the stock price prevailing before the issue announcement. These two 
variables represent rights issue characteristics at the time of announcement and are 
undoubtedly the two most direct and relevant pieces of information for the stock market. If 
the overvaluation of stock is high, managers of firms are more likely to raise as much new 
equity capital as quickly as possible. In addition, they are more likely to provide large offer 
price discount to make the equity issue a success. Since investors are concerned with 
adverse selection, the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the higher the size of 
an equity issue or the lower the equity offer price (i.e. the higher is the offer price discount), 
the more negative will be the information signaled to the market, and therefore, the larger 
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will be the decline in performance. 
 We use the ratio of market to book value of total assets as a proxy for free cash 
flows. Firms with higher amount of free cash flows are expected to engage more in 
overinvestments and have, therefore, a lower market to book ratio. If these firms decide to 
issue additional equity, then they are predicted to experience lower stock returns and lower 
post-issue operating performance. On the other hand, equity issues undertaken by firms 
with a higher market to book ratio of total assets would be interpreted as a sign of 
utilization of new investment opportunities. These firms are expected to undergo 
improvements in stock and operating performance. It should be noted here that the market 
to book ratio variable can also proxy for the growth rate of firms the differences in which 
may reflect information asymmetry. The presence of abundant investment opportunities 
(high growth) can be associated with higher market to book ratio while firms with abundant 
assets-in-place (low growth) can have a lower market to book ratio. One can use the R&D 
expenditures incurred by a firm as an alternate proxy, but it can also represent firm’s 
growth rate as well as free cash flows. Besides, such data are not available for the majority 
of our sample firms.11 
 In order to test the window of opportunity hypothesis which argues that equity 
issues announced during the period of favorable macroeconomic condition are expected to 
generate smaller stock price decline, we use several proxy variables. The annual growth 
rate of gross domestic product, the unemployment rate, the annual change in average stock 
 
11 Since these and other proxy variables suffer from the same problem, it  is empirically very 
difficult to clearly distinguish the information asymmetry hypothesis from the free cash flows 
hypothesis. 
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market prices are used to distinguish good years from bad years. The values of these 
variables are then used to dichotomize all years in the sample period. The years 
representing favorable economic condition are identified with the value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
4.5.3 Results 
 
 We now proceed to investigate if these three hypotheses can explain the earlier 
documented decline in stock return and operating performance of rights issuing firms. 
Therefore, we perform a cross-sectional regression analysis. The announcement period 
cumulative excess stock return and the post-issue cumulative excess operating performance 
of firms are used as the dependent variables. The explanatory variables are the ones used to 
proxy the information asymmetry, the free cash flows and the window of opportunity 
hypotheses. The regression results are presented in Tables 6 and 7.12  
 We observe in Table 6 (model 1) that the announcement period excess stock return 
is inversely related to the relative size of the rights issue. In this univariate analysis, the 
magnitude of the issue-size coefficient is –0.11 and it is also statistically significant (t-value 
= –2.04). The finding indicates that as the relative size of the rights issue increases, a larger 
decline in the stock price takes place. The result supports the prediction of the information 
asymmetry hypothesis that larger equity issues signal more negative information thereby 
depressing stock prices more. Bohren et al. (1997) find similar results for Norwegian rights 
 
12 For the sake of brevity, Table 7 reports results for the levels of operating performance. By 
performing similar regressions to explain changes in operating performance, the results do not 
change materially. 
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issues. 
 We find a significant positive relationship between the announcement period excess 
stock return and the relative offer price.13 The univariate regression coefficient of the 
variable is 0.31 (model 2) and is statistically significant (t-value = 2.22). The explanatory 
power of the issue-price variable is larger than that of the issue-size variable. The result is 
again consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis which posits that higher 
quality firms use higher subscription price, or smaller discounts, as a signal of quality, and 
therefore, experience a less negative price decline. The finding of a significant relationship 
may at first sight appear surprising because the offer price in a rights issue is theoretically 
considered to be irrelevant. However, as suggested by Eckbo and Masulis (1995), this 
argument does not necessarily hold in a world of asymmetric information. Prior studies 
(e.g. Slovin et al., 2000) also report significant relationship between offer price discount 
and announcement period stock returns. When both the issue-size and the issue-price 
variables are used in a bivariate regression framework (model 3), we obtain similar 
negative and positive coefficients. But, the coefficient of issue-size variable becomes 
statistically insignificant. This can be explained by the presence of statistically significant 
correlation between these two explanatory variables. We find that the estimated correlation 
coefficient is –0.4 and is statistically significant. The issue-price variable is also 
significantly positively related to post-rights issue operating performance of firms, as can 
be observed from Table 7. Overall, our results provide full support for the asymmetric 
 
13 The issue-price variable as reported in Table 7 is measured with respect to the stock price 
prevailing on the day before the issue announcement. If we scale with respect to other period’s 
stock prices, the results remain basically unchanged. 
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information hypothesis. 
 The overinvestment of free cash flows hypothesis predicts that stock return and 
operating performance will be positively related with issuing firms’ market to book ratio of 
total assets. The results of models 4 and 5 in Table 6 show that although the coefficient of 
the market to book ratio of total assets is positive, it is statistically insignificant.14 On the 
other hand, the results presented in Table 7 indicate that the market to book ratio is 
significantly positively related to various measures of operating performance. The 
regression coefficient is around 0.2 and remains stable among different specifications. The 
observed performance decline experienced by rights issuing firms receives, at least, partial 
support from the overinvestment of free cash flows hypothesis. 
 To determine whether corporate managers utilize the opportunity of favorable 
economic conditions to issue new equity, we investigate the relationship between 
announcement period stock return and the annual growth rate of gross domestic product. 
As reported in model 5 of Table 6, we observe that the GDP growth rate is insignificantly 
related  to stock returns. We also examine the relationship between the GDP growth rate 
and the operating performance of rights issuing firms. All but one regression coefficients 
are found to be statistically insignificant. Conducting tests using other proxy variables in 
both univariate and multivariate framework do not produce any significant result. The 
findings, therefore, fail to support the window of opportunity hypothesis. 
 In summary, the cross-sectional regression analysis indicates that the decline in 
both stock returns and operating performance of rights issuing firms is significantly related 
 
14 We also used other specifications of multivariate regressions and the variable remains 
statistically insignificant. 
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to the degree of information asymmetry between corporate managers and investors. We 
find that firms with higher information asymmetry experience larger decline in stock and 
operating performance. We also observe that rights offering firms with higher amount of 
free cash flows experience lower operating performance. The evidence is supportive of the 
view that rights issues may lead to more overinvestments by corporate managers. We do 
not, however, find any empirical evidence that the underperformance of rights issuing firms 
is caused by managers utilization of opportunistic timing. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
 We study a sample of equity rights offerings in the Netherlands and investigate if 
stock market valuation effect at issue announcement is consistent with subsequent 
operating performance of firms. Our empirical analysis reveals that stock prices decline 
significantly on the announcement of rights issues. It indicates that stock holders interpret 
equity rights issue as a negative news. The finding is consistent with several prior studies. 
We also observe that the stock market effect of rights offerings is diffused over a longer 
time period that encompasses the release of issue prospectus and the trading of rights. 
Additional examination shows that rights are actively traded during the subscription period. 
Rights trading reaches the maximum as the subscription period comes to the end. We also 
observe that a gradual decline in stock return takes place throughout the period of rights 
trading. 
 We then investigate if the decline in stock price reflects subsequent decline in 
operating performance of firms conducting rights issues. Therefore, we evaluate diverse 
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return on assets and return on sales variables for several years following rights offerings. 
Our analysis of the operating performance of issuing firms shows a significant worsening 
from one year up to five years after rights issues. The result is robust to different ways of 
measuring operating performance. It indicates that the stock market was able to anticipate 
already at the time of rights issue announcement the subsequent change in operating 
performance of issuing firms. Our study thus provides direct evidence on the link between 
stock market response to an information event and the resulting change in operating 
performance.  
 We also explore several explanations for the observed decline in stock returns as 
well as operating performance. Cross-sectional regression analysis shows that the relative 
offer price is significantly positively related to stock return and operating performance. The 
result is robust to alternative model specifications. We observe full empirical support for 
the prediction of the information asymmetry hypothesis: firms with greater information 
asymmetry (i.e. larger offer price discount) exhibit larger decline in performance. In 
addition, we find partial support for the prediction of the free cash flows hypothesis: firms 
with higher possibilities of overinvestment of free cash flows (i.e. lower market to book 
ratio) exhibit larger decline in performance. However, we do not find any evidence for the 
window of opportunity hypothesis as being an important motive to issue new equity. Stock 
return and operating performance of firms are not found to be significantly related with any 
of the variables representing favorable economic condition. 
 Overall, this study contributes to the large body of empirical research that attempts 
to test predictions from the corporate finance literature. It provides direct evidence on the 
link between stock performance on the capital market and operating performance on the 
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real market. Furthermore, the study sheds light on the flotation method of rights offering 
by analyzing the rights trading period in detail. It also complements prior studies which 
investigate the stock and operating performance of non-rights equity issues. In view of the 
available evidence on the effect of seasoned equity issues in general, we conclude that the 
effect of rights issues is not qualitatively different from non-rights issues. Both equity 
offering methods convey qualitatively similar information and produce qualitatively similar 
changes in stock price and operating performance. However, comparing our results with 
extant literature, we can conclude that the magnitude of decline in stock price and firm 
performance is smaller for firms conducting rights issues.  
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Table 1 
 
Selected descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for issue-characteristics such as issue-size and 
issue-price and some firm characteristics related to a sample of 58 equity rights 
offerings. Issue-size is expressed as relative to the market value of equity on the day 
before the announcement. Issue-price is expressed as relative to the closing stock price 
of one day and three days before the issue announcement as well as the average of 
closing stock prices for ten days before the announcement. Book value of total assets 
and market value of equity are expressed in millions of Euros. Market-to-book ratio is 
defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by book 
value of total assets. All firm characteristics are as of the issue year. 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 
Issue-size 
 
 
0.212 
 
0.159 
 
0.184 
 
0.990 
 
0.012 
 
Issue-price (-1) 
 
 
0.868 
 
0.877 
 
0.098 
 
1.00 
 
0.568 
 
Issue-price (-3) 
 
 
0.873 
 
0.885 
 
0.099 
 
1.00 
 
0.571 
 
Issue-price (-1, -10) 
 
 
0.872 
 
0.883 
 
0.099 
 
1.00 
 
0.569 
 
Book  value of total assets 
 
 
623 
 
178 
 
1023 
 
4367 
 
3 
 
Market value of equity 
 
 
349 
 
113 
 
623 
 
3093 
 
9 
 
Market-to-book ratio 
 
 
1.05 
 
0.99 
 
0.27 
 
2.09 
 
0.65 
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Table 2 
 
Excess stock returns around announcement of equity rights issues 
 
The table shows cumulative excess stock returns for various periods surrounding the 
announcement (day 0) of equity rights issues. Excess returns are calculated after 
adjusting for each stock’s systematic risk estimated from the Market Model, and are 
expressed in percentages. The t-statistic and the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics are 
used to test statistical significance of mean and median returns, respectively. The 
symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Mean excess returns 
 
 
Period Excess return t-statistic 
-60, -1 3.27 1.98* 
0, +1 -2.79 -7.89** 
+2, +30 -2.55 -1.76* 
0, +30 -5.34 -3.71** 
 
 
 
Panel B: Median excess returns 
 
 
Period Excess return z-statistic 
-60, -1 0.21 0.91 
0, +1 -1.76 3.09** 
+2, +30 -4.08 2.18** 
0, +30 -5.66 3.01** 
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Table 3 
 
Excess stock returns during the rights trading period 
 
The table shows average and cumulative average excess stock returns following the 
start of rights trading. Day 1 is the starting date of rights trading, which is 
approximately two to three weeks after the announcement of rights issue. All other 
days are measured relative to the starting date of rights trading. The total duration of 
rights trading varies across firms. Excess stock returns are calculated based on Market 
Model risk adjustments and are expressed in percentages. 
 
 
 
Trading day Excess return % Negative Cumulative excess return 
1 0.689 38 0.689 
2 -0.209 53 0.481 
3 -0.062 60 0.419 
4 -0.199 64 0.220 
5 -0.682 69 -0.462 
6 -0.452 56 -0.914 
7 -0.378 69 -1.292 
8 -0.059 60 -1.351 
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Table 4 
 
Abnormal levels of operating performance of companies subsequent to rights issues 
The table reports median abnormal levels of operating performance of firms for five years after rights issue with Year 0 used as the fiscal year of rights issue. The figures are 
expressed in percentages. Abnormal measures are calculated as the difference in performance between issuing firm and median non-issuing firm. Panel A reports four 
different return on assets (ROA) measures: the ratios of net income to average total assets, cash flow (net income plus depreciation plus the change in current assets excluding 
the change in cash minus the change in current liabilities plus the change in current maturities of long-term debt) to the average of total assets, earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) to the average of total assets, and earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to average total assets. Panel B reports four different 
return on sales (ROS) measures calculated using the same statistics as above but dividing by the average of total sales in lieu of the average of total assets. The symbols * and 
** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level (two-tailed), respectively, as indicated by the Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic. 
 
Panel A: ROA measures 
 
 
  
Year 0
 
Year 1
 
Year 2 
 
Year 3
 
Year 4
 
Year 5
 
Net income / Total assets 
 
-0.5 
 
-0.5 
 
-1.3* 
 
-1.1* 
 
-1.2 
 
-1.4* 
 
Cash flow / Total assets  
 
-1.5 
 
-0.3 
 
-3.2* 
 
-2.0 
 
-1.2 
 
-0.9 
 
EBIT / Total assets 
 
-0.4 
 
0.3 
 
-0.3 
 
-0.1 
 
-2.1** 
 
-2.1* 
 
EBITDA / Total assets 
 
0.3 
 
-0.2 
 
-1.3* 
 
-2.1 
 
-2.2** 
 
-3.3 
 
Number of observations
 
55
 
55
 
55
 
52
 
51
 
46
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Panel B: ROS measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 0 
 
Year 1 
 
Year 2 
 
Year 3 
 
Year 4 
 
Year 5 
 
Net income / Total sales 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.7 
 
-0.9* 
 
-1.0 
 
-1.1* 
 
Cash flow / Total sales 
 
-1.3 
 
0.1 
 
-1.9** 
 
-1.7* 
 
-1.4 
 
-1.1 
 
EBIT / Total sales 
 
0.5 
 
0.4 
 
-0.6 
 
-1.4* 
 
-1.7* 
 
-1.6* 
 
EBITDA / Total sales 
 
0.5 
 
1.6 
 
-1.8* 
 
-1.7 
 
-2.0* 
 
-2.0* 
 
Number of observations 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
52 
 
51 
 
46 
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Table 5 
 
Abnormal changes in operating performance of companies subsequent to rights issues 
The table reports year-to-year median abnormal percentage changes in operating performance of firms for five years after rights issue with Year 0 used as the fiscal year of 
rights issue. Abnormal measures are calculated as the difference in performance between issuing firm and median non-issuing firm. Panel A reports four different return on 
assets (ROA) measures: the ratios of net income to average total assets, cash flow (net income plus depreciation plus the change in current assets excluding the change in cash 
minus the change in current liabilities plus the change in current maturities of long-term debt) to the average of total assets, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the 
average of total assets, and earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to average total assets. Panel B reports four different return on sales 
(ROS) measures calculated using the same statistics as above but dividing by the average of total sales in lieu of the average of total assets. The symbols * and ** denote 
significance at the 10% and 5% level (two-tailed), respectively, as indicated by the Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic. 
 
Panel A: ROA measures 
 
 
 
Year -1 to 
Year 0
Year 0 to 
Year 1
Year 1 to 
Year 2
Year 2 to 
Year 3
Year 3 to 
Year 4
Year 4 to 
Year 5
 
Net  income / Total assets 
 
0.1 
 
-0.5 
 
0.1 
 
0.1 
 
-0.4 
 
0.2 
 
Cash flow / Total assets 
 
-0.3 
 
0.1 
 
-1.6* 
 
2.1 
 
-0.3 
 
1.4 
 
EBIT / Total assets 
 
0.2 
 
-0.7 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.3 
 
-0.3 
 
EBITDA / Total assets 
 
0.2 
 
-0.4** 
 
-1.0 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.1 
 
Number of observations 
 
51 
 
55 
 
54 
 
52 
 
51 
 
45 
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Panel B: ROS measures 
 
 
 
Year -1 to 
Year 0
Year 0 to 
Year 1
Year 1 to 
Year 2
Year 2 to 
Year 3
Year 3 to 
Year 4
Year 4 to 
Year 5
 
Net income / Total sales 
 
0.3 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.7* 
 
-0.1 
 
Cash flow / Total sales   
 
-0.6 
 
0.5 
 
-1.2 
 
1.3 
 
-1.6 
 
0.3 
 
EBIT / Total sales  
 
0.0 
 
-0.3 
 
-0.6* 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.8* 
 
EBITDA / Total sales 
 
0.1 
 
-0.4** 
 
-0.9** 
 
-0.5 
 
-0.6** 
 
-0.8** 
 
Number of observations
 
51
 
55
 
54
 
52
 
51
 
45
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Table 6 
 
Cross-sectional regressions of excess stock return on various explanatory variables 
The table reports results where the two-day announcement period Market Model risk-adjusted excess stock return is regressed on various explanatory variables. 
The explanatory variables are: issue-size  = the monetary amount of rights issue / market value of equity on the day before announcement; issue-price = the offer 
price / stock price on the day before the issue announcement; M/B = the ratio of market to book value of total assets; GDP = a dummy variable set to 1 if the issue 
occurs in years of relatively high growth rate of GDP. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the regression coefficients. 
The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  
 
 
Model       Intercept Issue-size Issue-price M/B GDP Adj. R2 
1      -0.01
(-0.49) 
-0.11 
(-2.04)** 
0.06
2       -0.29
(-2.39)** 
0.31
(2.22)** 
0.17
3     -0.25
(-1.88)* 
-0.05 
(-1.02) 
0.27 
(1.82)* 
0.17
4      -0.40
(-3.97)** 
0.42
(3.40)** 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.26
5  -0.34
(-4.38)** 
-0.02 
(-1.35) 
0.31 
(3.50)** 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.24 
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Table 7 
 
Cross-sectional regressions of excess operating performance on various explanatory variables 
The table reports results where the cumulative abnormal level of operating performance for five years after rights issue is regressed on various explanatory 
variables. The explanatory variables are: issue-size = the monetary amount of rights issue / market value of equity on the day before announcement; issue-price = 
the offer price / stock price prevailing one day before the issue announcement;  M/B = the ratio of market to book value of total assets; GDP = a dummy variable 
set to 1 if the issue occurs in years of relatively high growth rate of GDP. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the 
regression coefficients. The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
Dependent variable Intercept Issue-size    Issue-price M/B GDP Adj. R2 
Net  income / Total assets -1.01 
(-2.52)** 
-0.03 
(-0.14) 
0.82 
(2.20)** 
0.18 
(2.00)** 
0.03 
(0.53) 
0.14 
Cash flow / Total assets -0.81 
(-1.57) 
-0.08 
(-0.27) 
0.54 
(1.08) 
0.19 
(1.45) 
0.13 
(1.94)* 
0.09 
EBIT / Total assets -0.76 
(-2.62)** 
-0.17 
(-1.09) 
0.54 
(1.84)* 
0.21 
(2.77)** 
0.06 
(1.08) 
0.14 
EBITDA / Total assets -0.86 
(-2.19)** 
-0.15 
(-0.67) 
0.65 
(1.75)* 
0.19 
(1.90)* 
0.08 
(1.21) 
0.11 
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